Why have relations between civil servants and ministers turned so sour – and can they be repaired?

here is increasingly bad blood between ministers and civil servants in the UK government. The trend has been apparent for at least a decade, with the mood between officials and ministers darkening during the Conservative administrations of Theresa May and Boris Johnson, fuelled by conflict over Brexit.

It was anticipated that the arrival of Keir Starmer’s government would mark a renaissance in civil service-ministerial relations. To symbolise a new era, Starmer instructed ministers to write welcome notes to their civil servants.

Yet, so far, there has been little visible improvement in the relationship, as ministers have become increasingly frustrated. The prime minister denounced the British state as slow-moving, “flabby” and ineffectual.

Rumours are circulating in Whitehall that Starmer and his allies regret appointing Chris Wormald, a civil service traditionalist, as the new cabinet secretary. In July, the Guardian reported the prime minister had “buyer’s remorse” in the light of Wormald’s apparent inability to get the ship of state moving in the right direction.

But it’s not one-way traffic. Civil servants have become increasingly vocal in their criticism of politicians. Moazzam Malik, a former director-general in the Foreign Office, reflected that “our system of government is built on the principle that civil servants provide impartial, evidence-based advice and ministers make decisions. But when ministers behave badly, it is usually because they don’t like what they are being told – and decide to take it out on the messenger.”

An obvious factor in the growth of this animosity and ill-feeling between ministers and civil servants is the prevailing belief that the British state is failing and that, in the current climate, “nothing works”.

All recent governments have struggled with delivery. Politicians castigate bureaucrats for being slow-moving and incompetent. Civil servants respond by insisting there is insufficient clarity from ministers who are prone to favour disruptive public sector reorganisations rather than focusing on the hard slog of continuous improvement. And when blunders happen, the two sides are liable to blame each other.

Another element is confusion within the civil service about what it exists to achieve. Is the role of officials to advise and support ministers, or oversee practical implementation at the front line? Different ministers patently want different things from their officials, while too few politicians arrive in office with a clear understanding of how to get the best out of civil servants.

At the same time, there is a belief that officials are rarely held accountable, while senior leaders can too easily evade responsibility for high-profile failures. Not surprisingly, the modern civil service has suffered an identity crisis.

On top of this, politicians of all parties are less likely to respect prevailing institutional norms. Historically, civil servants and ministers in Britain formed a strong bond based on a mutually beneficial partnership, depicted by academics as a “public service bargain”. This idea was elaborated in the 1970s by social scientist Bernard Schaffer to analyse the characteristics of civil service bureaucracy.

That bargain, encapsulated in the 19th century Northcote-Trevelyan report, meant that officials “exchanged overt partisanship, some political rights and a public political profile in return for permanent careers, honours and a six-hour working day”. Ministers had to accept merit-based appointment in return for the loyalty, obedience and dedication of civil servants.

The Whitehall model was predicated on a “governing marriage” between ministers and bureaucrats reflecting the ethos of “club government”. Both sides knew one other through educational and social ties based on class background and there was implicit ideological consensus. This was articulated in the post-war era through support for liberal civil service Keynesianism. Above all, there was the prevailing belief in the “Rolls-Royce” Whitehall machinery as the most effective in the world.

End of the bargain

The shift to a “them and us” model began in earnest during the 1980s as the consensus shattered and politicians became more critical of civil servants. Increasingly, ministers sought to create an entourage of advisers and consultants, marginalising career officials.

The monopoly over policy advice was eroded, as thinktanks and non-governmental organisations were encouraged to enter the policy-making arena. Civil servants were incentivised to become managers overseeing delivery rather than policy advisers – a trend reinforced by subsequent governments.

The cumulative effect was to create distance between ministers and officials. Yet such developments were scarcely unique to Britain. A recent survey revealed that across the world, bureaucracies are struggling to provide impartial advice to ministers.

This was the consequence of “political interference, where there are increasing instances of political agendas overshadowing expert advice worldwide”. Alongside that is the growth of “misinformation, where the rapid spread of incorrect or partial information in the digital age is undermining the credibility of factual, unbiased advice”.

The problem is that in this environment, Britain is in danger of losing one of its most trusted institutions: an impartial, capable civil service. For all its faults, this service acts as a bulwark against the overweening power of the executive, while supporting ministers to achieve their goals.

Rather than castigating officials behind closed doors, the new administration should produce a reform agenda that will improve civil service performance, acting as a catalyst for wider public sector transformation.

This article first appeared in 'The Conversation' on 6 November 2025.