Identity at a Crossroads: UK Law and the Push for Digital IDs
The first time I was asked for ID in the United Kingdom, I instinctively reached for my phone. Back home in India, that reaction would have made perfect sense, because digital identity -accessible through your phone - has become part of everyday life. By contrast, in the UK, identity verification still relies heavily on physical documents, which can be inconvenient and risky for someone whose main proof of identity is a passport or a driving licence.
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That contrast made me reflect on why digital identity has developed so differently in the two countries. It is not just a question of technology, but also law, politics, privacy, and public trust.
WHAT DIGITAL ID MEANS
Digital identity can be understood as a secure electronic version of traditional identification, such as an online passport or driving licence. It uses personal information, and sometimes biometric data, to verify who a person is. The UK Government published an explainer of their digital identity plans in September 2025, stating that the proposed digital ID system would be a secure phone-based system, used to prove identity, age, and residency status, as well as to support right to work checks and access to services.
Digital IDs are usually said to offer three main advantages:
- Speed, because verification can happen in seconds rather than through manual checks.
- Security and privacy, because data can be encrypted and shared more selectively than with paper documents.
- Convenience, because most people already carry smartphones and can use one device for many forms of verification.
WHY THE UK HAS MOVED SLOWLY
The UK has not adopted a single national digital identity system in the way India has. Instead, it has taken a cautious, decentralised approach that relies on frameworks such as the UK Digital Identity and Attributes Trust Framework and providers like Yoti and Post Office in the UK to verify digital identity, rather than one universal government issued ID. That caution reflects longstanding political sensitivity around identity cards and concerns about surveillance, exclusion, and data misuse.
A major barrier is the continuing reliance on physical documents for official and everyday purposes, including travel, employment, education, and proof of age. Another is uneven implementation: digital identity systems have been introduced slowly and in a piecemeal fashion, with limited public confidence.
THE UK’S DIGITAL ID JOURNEY
Early attempts
The Identity Cards Act 2006 was the UK’s first major legislative attempt to create a national identity system. It required the Secretary of State to establish the National Identity Register and set out the personal information that could be recorded, including name, date and place of birth, nationality, address, immigration status, biometric information, and other registrable facts. The scheme was designed to support identity verification, immigration control, crime prevention, fraud reduction, and public services.
The Act became politically controversial because it was linked to a wider debate about state surveillance and the expansion of biometric registration. It was later repealed in 2010, and the failure of the scheme left a strong legacy of mistrust.
GOV.UK Verify
The next major attempt was GOV.UK Verify, launched to let people prove their identity online for government services. In practice, it struggled because of low public uptake, technical difficulties, and limited support across departments. It was eventually phased out, reinforcing the idea that a digital ID system cannot succeed without broad institutional and public buy-in.
The post-2021 framework
Instead of creating a single state-run identity scheme, the UK shifted towards a framework for private identity providers. This allowed digital right-to-work and right-to-rent checks to be carried out through certified providers under government standards. The approach was designed to enable digital identity without immediately creating a compulsory national card.
The proposal of mandatory digital IDs
The most significant recent proposal came in 2025, when the government announced a free digital ID scheme for UK citizens and legal residents. The digital ID would be stored on a phone and would include the person’s name, date of birth, nationality or residency status, and a photograph for biometric security. It was intended to be rolled out before the end of this Parliament, and would be mandatory for right-to-work checks, while also being used more broadly for access to services such as childcare, welfare, and some private-sector verification.
This proposal marked a shift from optional digital verification to a system with mandatory legal effect in at least one key area of life. At the same time, the government clarified that people would not be required to routinely carry or present the ID.
Recent reversal
The UK government initially proposed making digital identity verification mandatory for right to work checks, with the intention of streamlining employment verification. However, despite that ambition, the proposal faced strong criticism and public concern about privacy, state overreach, and the possibility of creating a de facto national ID system. That widespread opposition echoed the same concerns that had surrounded earlier identity-card proposals. The political lesson was clear: even where digital identity promises efficiency, the UK remains constrained by historical memory and distrust, thereby making digital identity plans no longer mandatory even for right to work checks. These plans may now be scrapped altogether under new Prime Minister Andy Burnham's leadership.
DIGITAL IDENTITY IN INDIA
In India, Aadhaar is the country's largest digital identity system. Administered by the Unique Identification Authority of India, it assigns residents a unique identification number linked to biometric information, such as fingerprints and iris scans, as well as basic demographic data. Many users can also access digital versions of their documents through the app DigiLocker, reducing the need to carry physical paperwork.
Although Aadhaar makes identity checks quick and convenient, it has also been criticised for privacy risks, surveillance concerns, and exclusion. These issues were considered by the Supreme Court of India in a series of cases. In 2017, the Court held in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India that privacy is a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution. Building on that decision, the Court later examined the legality of Aadhaar under the Aadhar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act 2016, and, in 2018, upheld the scheme's constitutional validity while placing limits on how Aadhaar data could be used and shared.
These cases moved the debate from a simple discussion on identity to a rights-based question about surveillance, collection of data and state power. It is a useful example as a comparison for the UK because it shows that digital identity systems can be efficient but still controversial and create problems if they are not carefully limited.
International Student View
As an international student, I experience the difference between the two systems directly. In India, proving my identity can be a fast digital task, while in the UK I often rely on a passport and face more formal document checks. That does not mean digital ID in the UK would automatically solve every practical problem, but it does show how identity systems shape ordinary life.
This is especially important for people like international students, migrant workers, and others who may not have easy access to the forms of identification commonly accepted in the UK. A well-designed digital system could reduce friction, but only if it is inclusive and legally secure.
WHY REFORM MATTERS
A dedicated digital identity act would help the UK move from scattered experiments to a coherent legal framework. While existing legislation, such as the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 provides an important statutory foundation, a dedicated act could give digital IDs clear legal recognition, set common standards for issue and verification, protect user rights over personal data, and build in safeguards for people without smartphones or digital skills. It could also reduce uncertainty for public bodies and private organisations.
But any reform would need to balance efficiency with trust. For example, the UK has had many issues with the e-visa system including inaccuracy of data, lack of support and digital exclusion. These and many other issues don’t bode well for a national roll out of digital ID. This experience suggests that digital identity is not just a technical tool; it is a constitutional and political issue as well.
CONCLUSION
Digital identity systems are ultimately about how the state verifies identity in a modern society. My experiences in India and the UK show that the challenge is not simply whether digital ID is possible, but whether it is trusted, lawful, and fair.
The UK has moved slowly because the subject carries historical baggage, privacy concerns, and political risk. If it wants to modernise identity verification, it will need a legal framework that is clear, inclusive, and credible from the start.
By Nikita Wadhwa, Student Blog Writer at QMLAC and LLB Law Student.
This blog is for information only and does not constitute legal advice on any matter. While we always aim to ensure that information is correct at the date of posting, the legal position can change, and the blogs will not ordinarily be updated to reflect any subsequent relevant changes. Anyone seeking legal advice on the subject matter should contact a specialist legal representative.
REFERENCES
https://www.nqa.com/en-gb/resources/blog/june-2024/diatf
https://inc42.com/buzz/digilocker-uidai-goi/
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/uk-has-it-wrong-digital-id-heres-why
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/digital-id-scheme-explainer/digital-id-scheme-explainer
https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2160?view_type=search&col=123456789/1362
https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/puttaswamy-v-india/
https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/puttaswamy-v-union-of-india-ii/
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c5y08z25q8eo